Scotty

Archived version

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Among the major announcements in the Liberals' Nov. 4 budget is a proposed $1-billion over four years to Transport Canada for an Arctic Infrastructure Fund (AIF), which will invest in major transportation projects in the North that have dual-use applications for civilians and the military. These can include airports, seaports, and all-season roads and highways, according to the budget document.

Huebert told The Hill Times that his biggest question regarding the AIF is what types of projects will it support, and whether security considerations will be at the forefront in the planning for these projects.

Prime Minister Mark Carney (Nepean, Ont.) announced back in June that Canada, along with allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, agreed to invest five per cent of annual GDP on defence by 2035. That pledge will be divided into an investment of 3.5 per cent of GDP on core military capabilities, with the remaining 1.5 per cent invested in defence and security infrastructure, including air and sea ports, telecommunications, emergency preparedness systems, and other dual-use investments intended to serve defence and civilian readiness.

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Kent Fellows, an assistant professor in the economics department and the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary, told The Hill Times that the AIF is a good idea and shows Ottawa is taking the Arctic seriously, adding that improving trade infrastructure in the North leads to economic benefits for all of the country.

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Pierre Leblanc, principal of Arctic Security Consultants and a retired colonel and former commander of the Canadian Forces in the Arctic, told The Hill Times that the AIF indicates the government is “shifting the centre of gravity” towards defence in the Arctic. He argues that current global threats to Canada’s national security, including from China, are possibly the worst he’s seen.

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Archived version

Here is the original Cisa report: BRICKSTORM Backdoor

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Chinese hackers are using a strain of malware to attack governments in several countries and maintain long-term access, according to U.S. and Canadian cybersecurity officials.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA) and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security published an advisory on Thursday outlining the BRICKSTORM malware based off an analysis of eight samples taken from victim organizations.

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“BRICKSTORM is a sophisticated and stealthy backdoor malware linked to PRC state-sponsored cyber actors,” said CISA Executive Assistant Director for Cybersecurity Nick Andersen.

The advisory includes indicators of compromise and detections organizations can use to tell if they have been impacted by the campaign involving the malware. The malware is used “for long-term persistence on victim systems,” according to U.S. agencies.

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The goal of the campaign is to steal valuable intellectual property and sensitive data — with a particular focus on the email inboxes of senior company leaders, according to Mandiant. The company attributed the campaign to a threat actor they previously accused of abusing vulnerabilities in firewall products from tech company Ivanti.

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Japan and Canada share critical interests that create natural opportunities for co-operation. Japan has focused on building partnerships with Southeast Asian countries ... Canada, similarly, is accelerating trade talks not only with Japan, South Korea, and the EU, but also with Indonesia, through the recently concluded Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.

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Canada and Japan should establish regular ministerial consultations on trade strategy and share intelligence on Chinese economic coercion tactics and the U.S.’s negotiating positions. Joint démarches at the WTO regarding both Chinese coercion and U.S. unilateralism could strengthen multilateral institutions. Enhanced bilateral economic agreements could include critical mineral partnerships, joint infrastructure investments in third countries, and co-ordinated approaches to Indo-Pacific economic frameworks. In addition, regular Track 2 dialogues between business communities could identify concrete co-operation opportunities.

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There are some useful lessons in Australia’s ... experience with China’s economic coercion. In that case, the impacts of China’s retaliation proved surprisingly minimal, suggesting the costs of decoupling are lower than what had been assumed. In fact, most of the industries that were targeted successfully shifted to other markets, making China’s market matter less and thereby reducing the fear of trade weaponization and giving Australia more confidence vis-à-vis China.

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As they say in Alberta, “When your neighbour’s barn is on fire, you don’t haggle over the price of water.” Canada and Japan, facing similar pressures from both East and West, would do well to remember that in times of trial, true friendship means standing together rather than cutting separate deals.

Archived link

Canada’s federal police are scaling back the use of Chinese-made drones over security concerns, creating an opening for Taiwan’s firms to supply key systems and components.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) operates 1,230 drones, of which 973 — about 80% of the fleet — are made in China. They are now classed as high-risk devices restricted to non-sensitive tasks such as missing-person searches and community policing, rather than border security or joint work with US agencies.

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RCMP documents suggest Chinese drones were originally chosen because they were cheaper, with non-Chinese models costing roughly twice as much at about NT$790,000 (CA$35,000) each. A Canadian academic quoted in the filings warned that any connected device can expose users to security vulnerabilities.

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The same documents note that the police force’s non-Chinese drones currently come from France, the US, and Belgium, and that Canada has no domestic drone maker to fill the gap. A security scholar at the Centre for International Governance Innovation urged federal agencies to look beyond price and give priority to “Made in Canada” platforms when possible.

Vancouver Taiwan Trade Center Director Chiu Shih-min (邱仕敏) said other Canadian departments are likely to move away from Chinese drones and seek trusted suppliers. He argued Taiwan is well placed, citing its strengths in airframe design, control stations, and communications. Chiu floated a model in which Taiwanese-made systems are shipped to Canada for final assembly to qualify as locally made.

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Archived link

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The Gulf state committed to invest USD$70 billion in Canada, covering energy, AI logistics, mining and several other strategic sectors. Furthermore, Ottawa framed the trip as part of a broader pivot away from U.S. trade dependence as Donald Trump’s tariffs reshape global commerce. Carney’s government wants to double non-U.S. exports within ten years and attract $1 trillion in new investment over five years.

Carney said Ottawa is also working to finalize a USD$1-billion project that will expand Canada’s critical minerals processing capacity. He told the Canada–U.A.E. Business Council that the deal would create jobs and increase the long-term supply of minerals needed for advanced manufacturing. He suggested that more details will follow soon.

Canada’s ambitions come as global pressure mounts to diversify mineral supply chains. Many of these minerals power electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels and defense technologies. However, China dominates most stages of the sector. According to the International Energy Agency, China holds an average market share of 70 per cent for 19 of 20 key minerals. It refines 91 per cent of rare earth elements. In 2024, it controlled 96 per cent of refined graphite, 78 per cent of refined cobalt, 70 per cent of refined lithium and 44 per cent of refined copper.

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Canada operates several domestic facilities that process aluminum and uranium, and it maintains a few copper, nickel and zinc smelters. However, it has little or no refining capacity for lithium or rare earth elements. This gap presents a major challenge for any attempt to build full supply chains within the country.

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Canada has tried to move up the chain. Its 2022 Critical Minerals Strategy set out a plan to secure supply, attract investment and expand domestic processing. The federal list includes 34 minerals deemed essential for economic or national security reasons. The list includes antimony.

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Only eight of Canada’s 32 critical mineral processing centers are owned by Canadian companies. In addition, the rest belong to parent companies based in the United Kingdom, United States, Switzerland, Brazil, France, Germany and Luxembourg.

At the end of October, the federal government announced the first round of projects under a G7 critical minerals alliance. The initiative further aims to counter China’s dominance by building supply networks among allied countries. Global News also reported that the 25 approved items include offtake agreements for a Quebec graphite mine and funding to expand rare earth processing in Ontario.

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Canada also agreed to support a Norwegian company’s plan to build a synthetic graphite plant in St. Thomas, Ontario. Vianode said earlier this year that it signed a multi-billion-dollar supply deal with General Motors. Export Development Canada may finance up to $500 million of the Ontario project. Graphite plays a central role in EV battery anodes.

A Ucore Rare Metals facility in Kingston, Ontario, also received conditional approval for up to $36 million in federal funding. The refinery aims to scale processing of samarium and gadolinium. These elements appear in nuclear technology and MRI equipment. The plant expects to begin production in 2026.

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Rare earth elements represent an area with significant potential. Saskatchewan Research Council officials said in 2022 that Canada holds large rare earth resources. The U.S. Geological Survey estimated Canada’s rare-earth oxide equivalent reserves at 830,000 tonnes in 2024. Meanwhile, China holds 44 million tonnes, and Brazil holds 21 million tonnes. Another CBC News report estimated more than 14 million tonnes of rare earth oxides in Canadian ground. There are 21 active rare earth projects moving through exploration and evaluation stages across the country.

Canada also currently has only one producing rare earth mine. Nechalacho in the Northwest Territories, owned by Vital Metals, ships its ore to Saskatchewan for initial processing before final separation in Norway. China operates thousands of mines, including the massive Bayan Obo complex, and produced 270,000 tonnes of rare earths in 2024.

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The Government of Canada has issued a travel advisory for China, urging Canadian citizens to exercise a high degree of caution due to various safety risks, including the possibility of arbitrary detention and the presence of extensive surveillance. Travelers are advised to remain vigilant and follow local regulations to ensure their safety while visiting this diverse yet complex country. The advisory, last updated on November 3, 2025, highlights several key areas of concern, including potential travel restrictions in sensitive regions like Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Tibet, as well as the growing issue of petty crime and scams in popular tourist spots.

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It's a diplomatic reset that would have seemed unimaginable months ago. After years of mutual hostility, Canada and China are beginning to thaw their once-frosty relationship. But **former national security analyst and policy advisor Dennis Molinaro **says Canada's failure to act on decades of Chinese intelligence warnings has hurt our country's ability to meet current geopolitical challenges. He speaks with Piya Chattopadhyay about the long and complicated history of Canada-China relations – and the lessons that should be applied to today.

This is a podacst (19 min).

Dr. Molinaro is a researcher at the University of Ontario focusing on counter-intelligence, foreign interference, the history of intelligence and the use of emergency powers in peacetime.

Dennis Molinaro also wrote an opinion piece: China’s secret war in Canada

... the West’s interactions with nation-states such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), they have been governed by a specific delusion for half a century. Canada ... believed that if it did business with China, extended a hand of friendship, China would transform itself into a liberal-democratic country. Trade would lead to freedom. But Canada was wrong. Beijing never considered joining a liberal order and instead used Canada as a backdoor to the U.S. and as a means of exploiting resources and technology.

... The stories of secret PRC police stations in the news a little more than a year ago weren’t a new phenomenon. The PRC had been interfering and seeking to influence the political and civic life in Canada for decades. And Canadian leaders have done little to deter adversaries from operating here.

But how did such a situation arise? To date, Canadians have had diplomatic histories of the Canada-China relationship but an intelligence history wasn’t incorporated into them. That’s necessary if Canada hopes to have a realistic appraisal and understanding of the relationship.

... The China that Canada’s leaders saw and engaged with was one they invented in their own minds. They saw a potential market for wheat and potash. They saw a counterweight to the U.S. They convinced themselves that economic liberalization would inevitably lead to political freedom. They weren’t alone in this thinking, even the U.S. adopted it, though its defences against Beijing were more developed than Canada’s.

... But the truth was that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) used western openness to build its economy and modernize its military. They used western universities to train their scientists. The West dreamed of partnership while China planned for dominance.

... The regime in Beijing operates on a concept of transnational sovereignty. It believes anyone of Chinese descent, regardless of their citizenship, owes their loyalty to China. By this logic, it doesn’t respect Canada’s borders as it hunts its critics in Canada. It harasses the Uyghur community, Tibetans, the Falun Gong, and Hong Kong pro-democracy activists and Taiwan independence supporters. It uses threats against family members back home to silence dissidents in places such as Vancouver and Toronto.

... This is transnational repression. It’s a foreign state enforcing its political will on Canadian soil ... The United Front Work Department is an arm of the Chinese Communist Party tasked with influencing foreign elites and controlling the PRC diaspora abroad. Its goal is to make foreign decision-makers sympathetic to Beijing’s interests, and it cultivates relationships with influential figures at all levels from school boards to Parliament. In return, it expects support for China’s interests and silence on its indiscretions. During the April 2024 Hogue inquiry into foreign interference, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service reported that it believed China interfered in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections.

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Archived link

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Politics are colliding with the Air Force’s wishes as Industry Minister Mélanie Joly (Ahuntsic-Cartierville, Que.) has indicated interest in a Gripen purchase, and the domestic economic benefits that will accompany it, while the F-35 is widely believed to be the air force’s preferred choice.

“The instability of the Americans is locked in for the foreseeable future. It may or may not go away with [U.S. President Donald] Trump. But we need to make a decision now,” said former Liberal MP John McKay, who served as the chair of the House Defence Committee in the last Parliament and co-led the Canadian section of the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defence, which serves as the main strategic advisory body for bilateral defence co-operation.

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McKay said that Trump isn’t a reliable defence partner. “Canadians should take the measure of the man,” he said.

He said that Canada can assert its own industrial and military sovereignty through having the ability to build an airplane that is not dependent upon the whims of an American president or anyone else.

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McKay said that he would advise Prime Minister Mark Carney (Nepean, Ont.) to proceed with the Swedish proposal as a new partner.

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McKay said that picking the Gripen could lead to some sort of American trade action given Trump’s penchant for retaliatory threats.

“We are in a new environment, and we can no longer depend on the United States for a rules-based trading environment,” he said.

He called the Gripen offer a “once-in-a-lifetime” opportunity to develop an aerospace industry in Canada.

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“It’s [the Gripen purchase] a huge opportunity that overwhelms whatever the military considerations are,” he said, remarking that those who consider the F-35 superior to Gripen “may well be right,” but added that Canada can choose something that is “almost best in class” over the best-in-class jet.

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The Agri-Food Analytics Lab at Dalhousie University and professional services firm MNP recently released the second edition of the Global Agri-Food Most Influential Nations Ranking report, which evaluates the competitiveness of G20 nations in the global food and beverage sector. Canada, which was placed 13th last year, has moved up to seventh position.

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Canada remains in tier two behind the E.U. (which wasn’t part of last year’s report), the U.S., and the U.K., but above Japan, China, and India. At the report release event in Mississauga, Ont., yesterday, Sylvain Charlebois, director of the Agri-Food Analytics Lab, explained Canada’s position improved due to advancements in trade, infrastructure and innovation. However, food insecurity (one in four Canadians experience some form of food insecurity), commercialization, and sustainability (specifically lack of performance data) are ongoing concerns.

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During a panel discussion at the event, Chris Neal, co-owner, Neal Brothers Foods and CEO, Jonluca Neal, mentioned the Buy Canadian movement “allowed a lot of smaller brands to prosper,” both from a consumer perspective as well as uptick in retail. However, companies can’t rely on Canadian patriotism to grow in the long term.

As Matt MacDonald, national leader, Food & Beverage Processing, MNP, said, “We are underfunded as a country. We need more investment in infrastructure. We want to see more private capital going into the market.”

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According to the report, more than 300 agri-food tech start-ups have raised over US$3 billion to date. However, commercialization is a persistent bottleneck for Canadian companies.

The report found, “A 37 per cent drop in R&D investment since 2023, a lack of scale-up support, and limited access to innovation hubs have stalled the trajectory for early stage ventures and rural innovators alike. Technology adoption is strong overall but largely limited to large-scale operations.”

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Charlebois stressed that innovation and increased private capital investments is key to growing the Canadian economy. He also highlighted the need to build market currency and gain public trust.

“Canada is its worst enemy,” he said. “We need to learn to sell stuff. We need to be better at marketing ourselves.”

Additionally, he stressed on the need for Canada to make the food processing sector a strategic pillar of growth by increasing automation and helping companies scale up.

“We have a lot of GDP leakage when it relates to finished goods. We are a world-class primary producer, and we are, I would just say nicely, not a world-class food manufacturer,” explained MacDonald. “We sell our primary production to other countries for them to process it, and then they sell it back, right? I want to see more processing done in Canada.” Amen to that!

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In Canada, four companies control 72 per cent of national retail sales, which according to the report, is one of the highest levels of concentration in the G20. This level of consolidation limits competition, adds undue pressure on producers, and slows innovation. F&B manufacturing companies are often at the mercy of grocers. Neal highlighted the disappearance of independent stores, which has made it harder for young companies to break into the retail sector.

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The report suggests governments and industry can spark growth by “expanding support for independent retailers, encouraging innovation in restaurants, and addressing the digital gap in food retail, where the country trails behind global peers.”

Charlebois hopes the Grocery Code of Conduct will help create an equitable ecosystem that’s beneficial for all stakeholders.

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Archived link

The annual reports from Communications Security Establishment Canada make for unexpectedly good reading. In recent years, the intelligence and cybersecurity agency has intercepted foreign espionage efforts, extremist networks, cybercriminal crews, and sprawling disinformation campaigns. The newest edition recounts how, in 2024, its units shut down a ransomware threat aimed at a Canadian industrial sector in only forty-eight hours.

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CSE origins stretch back to 1941, when Canada created the Examination Unit (XU), the country’s first civilian bureau devoted to breaking and protecting coded communications. During the war, the XU decrypted enemy messages and forged intelligence relationships that would later anchor today’s Five Eyes alliance. The bureau’s success convinced Ottawa that understanding foreign networks was strategically indispensable, and, in 1946, the Communications Branch of the National Research Council was established—what we now know as CSE.

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[That's a Q&A with CSE chief Caroline Xavier about the legacy and the challenges facing the agency today.]

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Question: What is the greatest cyber threat facing Canadians? What makes us uniquely vulnerable?

CSE chief Caroline Xavier: The most significant threats come from state-sponsored cyber actors who are growing more assertive. These adversaries target Canadian government institutions, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations to steal sensitive data, disrupt services, and influence public discourse. Their attacks are becoming more sophisticated and persistent.

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Today, we block billions of malicious actions daily, respond to thousands of cyber incidents annually, and issue pre-ransomware alerts that save Canadian organizations millions of dollars.

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[The CSE grew] from sixty-two employees in 1946 to over 3,800 today. We publish reports and advisories like the National Cyber Threat Assessment and Threats to Canada’s Democratic Processes. Our latest annual report highlights our work across foreign signals intelligence, cyber operations, Arctic security, and critical infrastructure protection. In it you will read about how, last year alone, we produced over 3,000 foreign intelligence reports, responded to more than 2,000 cyber incidents, and issued 336 pre-ransomware notifications—preventing up to 148 incidents and saving an estimated $6 to $18 million.

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Ransomware ... remains the most pervasive cybercrime affecting Canadians. The attacks are not just costly; they can cripple essential services like health care, energy, and transportation, putting lives and livelihoods at risk.

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As ... a vocal advocate of democratic values, Canada is a high-value target for adversaries seeking to undermine Western institutions. The strategic value of our private sector and world-class universities further increases our exposure to cyber threats.

That exposure is compounded by vulnerabilities closer to home. Our critical infrastructure is often decentralized, managed at provincial and municipal levels, which can result in inconsistent cybersecurity standards and coordination challenges. The cybercrime ecosystem is highly interconnected and often knows no borders.

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We emphasize the importance of public–private collaboration, threat intelligence sharing, and proactive risk management. Cybersecurity is a shared responsibility, and our collective defence depends on coordinated action across government, industry, and civil society. We encourage all Canadians to explore our latest National Cyber Threat Assessment to better understand the trends we’re seeing and the steps we can all take to stay secure.

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CSE plays a vital role [in combating disinformation], but we want to be clear: CSE does not monitor domestic communications or social media. Our mandate is strictly focused on foreign signals intelligence and protecting government systems from cyber threats.

Our contribution is more visible through the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, alongside Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Global Affairs Canada. Together, we identify and reduce threats to Canada’s democratic institutions, including foreign interference and disinformation campaigns targeting voters, political parties, and media.

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One of the most significant actions was the designation of Ukraine and Latvia’s electronic networks as “Systems of Importance” to the Government of Canada in March 2022. This designation ... marked the first time such powers were used for entities outside Canada. It enabled CSE to provide direct cybersecurity assistance to both countries.

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While CSE maintains deep and long-standing partnerships with the Five Eyes, these relationships operate within clearly defined mandates and operational frameworks. But partnership is only one side of the equation. Protecting sovereignty also means securing not only our borders but also our digital frontiers and the homeland. It’s fundamental to Canada’s national security, economic resilience, and democratic integrity.

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Archived link

On November 22, Australia, Canada, and India unveiled a new trilateral partnership. The Australia-Canada-India Technology and Innovation (ACITI) Partnership, announced during the G-20 Summit in Johannesburg, commits the three countries to collaborate on emerging technologies, critical minerals, artificial intelligence, and green energy innovation.

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The announcement comes at a time when middle powers are steadily experimenting with specialized, issue-focused groupings. Minilateralism has become a preferred way for states to pursue targeted cooperation without the burdens of alliances or the paralysis of large multilateral organizations.

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First, until now, India, Australia, and Canada have not operated within a dedicated institutional framework focused on high technology and innovation. Their interactions have remained bilateral, episodic, or embedded within broader platforms, such as the G-20 or the Commonwealth. ACITI introduces a structured, issue-based mechanism that ties the three together in a way that neither geography nor formal alliances previously did.

Second, the geography of the grouping is particularly distinctive. Most minilaterals cluster within a single strategic theater. By contrast, ACITI stretches across Asia, Oceania, and North America. It links three regions whose engagements have historically been mediated through larger Western institutions or broader Indo-Pacific strategies. By forming a triangle that spans oceans rather than strengthening an existing regional silo, the partnership implicitly advocates for a different approach to strategy that is not region-bound.

Third, equally significant is the language in which this partnership has been framed. References to net-zero transitions, responsible technology, democratic innovation, and critical supply-chain resilience indicate that ACITI is based on normative convergence. Each country – Australia, Canada, and India – sees technology governance and the green transition as arenas where political identity is expressed. For this reason, the formation of ACITI is also a symbolic articulation of shared democratic values. This introduces a layer of uncertainty that is unusual for new minilaterals.

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ACITI arrives at a time of uneven political alignment among its members. The success of trilaterals depends on the stability of all three bilateral legs. For now, the Canada-India leg is visibly weaker. While Australia-India ties are robust and expanding, the Canada-India relationship has experienced deep turbulence over the past few years. Diplomatic tensions, political accusations, and diaspora driven flashpoints have created moments of severe strain.

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There is another challenge as well: the geopolitical environment in which ACITI has emerged. Technology partnerships increasingly operate under the shadow of major power competition. China is likely to interpret ACITI as another democratic arrangement designed to complicate its technological and industrial dominance. The United States may welcome it, but Washington’s tendency to fold every initiative into its own strategic logic could place unforeseen pressure on the triangle. Managing these cross-pressures while maintaining autonomy will be a key test of ACITI’s strategic maturity.

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ACITI captures the possibilities of new minilateral thinking, but also exposes the vulnerabilities that come with untested diplomatic geometry. Whether it endures will depend on institutional follow-through, political steadiness, and the ability to deliver early. If it succeeds, it could serve as a template for a new class of ... partnerships defined by innovation rather than geography.

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Opinion piece by Scott E. Simon, chair of Taiwan studies at the University of Ottawa.

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China has co-ordinated an all-of-society attack against Japan ever since Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi answered a question in the National Diet on Nov. 7 to clarify that Chinese military action in a Taiwan conflict would be a “survival-threatening situation.” This classification could justify mobilization of Japan’s Self-defence Forces in certain contingencies.

The immediately shocking response was that China’s Consul General in Osaka, Xue Jian, seemed to threaten decapitation of Takaichi in a since-deleted X post. Rather than apologize for the consul’s inappropriate remarks, China doubled down in a domestic and international campaign against Japan.

In a PLA Daily editorial, translated and published by Global Times, China’s military characterized Takaichi’s remarks as the most aggressive act against China in 80 years, raised the spectre of Japanese militarism and warned that Japan will suffer consequences if Takaichi does not retract her “wrong remarks.”

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Takaichi’s remarks echoed the words of former prime minister Shinzo Abe, who warned that “a Taiwan contingency is a contingency for Japan.” These observations are based on undeniable geographical reality. Taiwan is only 110 kilometres from the Japanese island of Yonaguni, yet 180 kilometres from China across the Taiwan Strait. Proximity means that any Chinese military action to encircle Taiwan would inevitably encroach upon Japanese territorial waters and airspace.

Moreover, the fact remains that the People’s Republic of China has never ruled Taiwan. Since the Taiwanese people are unlikely to willingly accept occupation from a foreign authoritarian state, China is preparing for military aggression.

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China also escalated its military threats to Japan. On Nov. 16, China sent Coast Guard ships through the uninhabited Senkaku Islands. China’s actions disregard the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty, which explicitly transferred the island from U.S. occupation to Japan. Just as China sent forces to Senkaku, its foreign ministry posted on X a historical document declaring that Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and minor islands.

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China also singled out Japan at precisely the moment when the G7 foreign ministers met in the Niagara Region of Canada and issued a joint statement about the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The statement emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, opposed unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, encouraged resolution of issues by dialogue and supported Taiwan’s meaningful participation in appropriate international organizations.

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China is pressuring G7 states to abandon the collective goal of upholding the status quo in the Taiwan Straits. In an October rebuke to Germany, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun argued that talk of maintaining the status quo while refusing to oppose “Taiwan independence” amounts to “condoning and supporting separatist activities.” China’s actions toward Japan and Germany are clearly part of a strategy to undermine unity in the G7, even if Chinese officials seem superficially to differ in their approach to Canada.

The op-ed published by China’s Ambassador Wang Di in the Globe and Mail recently, following a meeting between Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, must be read in light of these developments. While promising a new era of China-Canada relations, Xi and Wang reiterated that “China and Canada should develop an objective and rational perception of each other, view each other in the correct way.”

As Michael Kovrig argued last month, vocabulary of perception encompasses a set of political demands. China’s demands about perception are requests to acquiesce to China’s position on Taiwan and other “core” issues, abandon much of Canada’s own Indo-Pacific Strategy and stop framing China as a security threat.

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Mounting tensions between China and Japan should be a warning sign. Canada, like Japan, has a long-standing policy of taking note of China’s claims to Taiwan without publicly challenging or endorsing them. China, impatient with this approach, is trying to drive a wedge between G7 allies — sweet-talking Canada while rebuking Germany and threatening Japan. The temptation for Canada may be to remain silent about Chinese sable-rattling.

But, a free and open Indo-Pacific, including the resilience of Taiwan, undergirds Canadian prosperity.

Carney should oppose all Chinese threats toward Japan before the situation escalates further. This is the time for G7 unity, rather than subservience to a third authoritarian power.