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CISA Releases Guidance Urging Water Treatment Facilities to Disconnect Equipment From the Internet
(www.privacyguides.org)
This is a most excellent place for technology news and articles.
Why the fuck
is your PLC
facing the fucking internet!
Jesus Zombie Christ an a pogo stick. Has no one been paying attention for the last two decades? Seriously, we learned this sort of lesson in Two Thousand and fucking Three. Your critical assets do not get public IP addresses.
2003??? We were learning this shit from Ferris Bueller back in the early 80s!!!
I did some work for a company that owned a /16 public IP range and used it on their internal network. I had to put a safety rated control system on it that ran mining machines that weighed 60 tons and cost a couple of million bucks each.
They gave me a subnet range for the system that was clearly non-private and I was like, "ummmmm, is that on the Internet?"
Apparently it wasn't routed to the rest of the Internet but it always felt like it was one misconfigured router away from disaster.
It usually happens in 2 steps.
First step is that everything gets connected to the LAN and you can only access the PLC network from within the building's network. Then some time later, management finds out that keeping someone on-call to go out costs a fortune, so they request that access be made so they can make the change from anywhere.
The IT team argues security, but no new hardware can be provisioned and a developing a new process is too hard. Then the magical phrase is uttered: "Just make it work". So IT punches a hole in the firewall, adds a NAT rule, and job done.
Literally this. It starts with “everything needs to be on an air gapped LAN so we can control it.” And then suddenly that air gapped LAN isn’t air gapped, because someone got tired of paying the call-out fee every time the on-call person had to drive to the site to push a few buttons on a keyboard. But figuring out a proper VPN (or at least a reverse proxy with access control) was too difficult or expensive, (management thinks the point is to save money on call out fees, not spend money on proper hardware) so they just poked a bunch of port-forwarded holes in the firewall and called it a day.
Sadly yes, this is exactly what happens. And it ends up being IT holding the bag at the end, with the managers having long since cashed out their stock options and left.
"Well, we just bought this new monitoring platform from my cousin's company and they need access to it. No, their platform doesn't support any real secure protocols and won't route over a VPN, it needs to be on the same subnet as the devices. Ok, then just open all ports to the network so they can connect. No, they don't know what port or protocol, it also runs out of my cousin's house so it's on a dynamic IP so you can't create some type of access rule for it. Just put an any/any rule in and it's good. What do you mean we already have a monitoring platform? Well, this one is better!"