Technology

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/10680273

Here is the study: Algorithm Manipulation: China’s Image on TikTok as Seen by Polish Users (pdf)

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The issue of content manipulation on non-Western platforms, such as TikTok—the international version of the Chinese platform Douyin, launched by ByteDance in 2017—is particularly important for understanding the influence of authoritarian regimes on online discourse in democratic societies such as Poland, where freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed and protected by law.

A new study examines the potential implications of algorithmic manipulation affecting Polish users through six keywords: Xinjiang, Tibet, Tiananmen Square Massacre, Taiwan, human rights in China, and re-education camps in China. Given TikTok’s large user base in Poland, it can be argued that manipulation of the platform’s algorithms may influence how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is perceived by Polish society.

Key points:

• The results show that the average Polish user of the platform, seeking information on topics related to China – especially sensitive issues such as Xinjiang, Tibet, human rights, and re-education camps – would receive content that was overwhelmingly pro-Chinese in nature.
• In the case of TikTok, there is no censorship mechanism ... Nevertheless, the study results indicate that it may seek to suppress topics deemed undesirable or controversial.
• **This stands against the transparency and unrestricted access to information guaranteed by the EU and Polish law **and demonstrates that apps from countries with controlled information environments may not be willing to sufficiently safeguard their products against information manipulation.
• The results of the conducted research indicate that there are at least several English-language accounts on the app responsible for spreading pro-Chinese propaganda messages. A few characteristics indicate their direct links to the Chinese propaganda mechanism, including they exclusively discuss topics important to the PRC’s message, promote an extremely pro-Chinese message, attempt to discredit individuals criticizing the CCP’s {Chinese Communist Party's] actions, and publish large amounts of professionally prepared content despite posing as, for example, ordinary tourists in China.
• Their scale of operations is large enough to contribute to shaping the views and attitudes of their audiences. Currently, the scale of operations of Polish-language propaganda channels is relatively low, but it cannot be ruled out that this will increase in the future.

Furthermore, it should be assumed that English-language content also represents an attractive source of information and knowledge for Polish users of the app.

Many of the materials classified as „pro-China” based on the adopted criteria contained statements or statements fully consistent with messages approved by the Publicity Department and other bodies directly subordinate to the CCP [Chinese Communist Party].

• The app does not designate state-owned channels as “state-controlled media,” as Facebook does. This means that it is impossible to determine which channels on the platform operate directly under government control.
• Meanwhile, research conducted by, among others, Taiwanese insittutions indicates the existence of a network of channels directly uploading propaganda content from the Chinese version of the app (Douyin) to TikTok.

Furthermore, a June 2025 DoubleThink Lab opinion poll ... revealed that Taiwanese frequent users of the platform are turning to pro-China and anti-American views. In case of this study, it was Mandarin-language content aimed at Taiwanese users, but it cannot be ruled out that the pro-Chinese content described in this report could similarly shape users’ (including Polish users) perception of China.

On a regional scale, as revealed in a report published in October 2025 by the Moldovan Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation (Centrul Pentru Comunicare Strategica Si Contracarare A Dezinrmarii, 2025), the platform’s non-transparent algorithm and lack of AI content moderation were used, among others, by entities linked to the Russian Federation to attempt to influence voters’ beliefs in the 2024 presidential elections.

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The issue of an effective metric for measuring the “impact” of cognitive activities – including China’s propaganda offensive – is currently being addressed by global and European organizations researching FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference), which refers to the manipulation of and interference in the information environment by external actors (such as Russia and China).

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The examined material raises legitimate doubts about the impartiality of the TikTok app. It is impossible to definitively answer the question whether this is solely the result of the algorithm itself or the presence of a significant number of propaganda channels on the platform, whose activities are not moderated or labeled in any way.

This raises doubts, especially considering the platform’s subordination to a Chinese entity (ByteDance) operating within the Chinese legal system. Therefore, the app has significant potential to become a tool for shaping audience attitudes and views in the event of large-scale influence operations. Given the scale of Sino-Russian cooperation in information exchange, the TikTok app may pose a potential threat to the security of Polish users.

Therefore, it is recommended not only to approach content appearing on the platform critically, but also to refrain from publishing sensitive data on the platform – this is particularly relevant for government entities and individuals associated with the state apparatus.

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[Edit to insert direct link to the study.]