The China Strategic Risks Institute (CSRI), a global think tank, warns says Canada must urgently address what it describes as “strategic vulnerabilities” in the Arctic, involving areas such as surveillance, foreign investment screening, scientific cooperation, and influence over international narratives.
The report, “Closing Strategic Gaps in the Face of China’s Expanding Influence in the Canadian Arctic" (pdf), concludes with several recommendations to address the vulnerabilities identified in the gap analysis. It should be noted that none of these recommendations will find success without the Indigenous Communities in the Arctic being full partners:
- Strengthen Arctic surveillance and domain awareness, through establishing an interdepartmental Arctic surveillance coordination framework, led by the Department of National Defence in partnership with Transport Canada and RCMP; updating the 2022 NORAD modernization package to account for the evolving threat environment; differentiating Canadian Arctic sovereignty priorities from NORAD’s continental defence mandate by supplementing joint investments with Canada-only projects; accelerating vessel, aircraft, and satellite renewal to avoid capability gaps; expediting procurement and R&D of modernized surveillance technology tailored for Arctic conditions; and mandating a clearly defined share of defence spending for Arctic security as part of Canada’s 2% of GDP spend on defence. There are opportunities for synergies between engineers and scientists that have already been working in the Arctic to drive new military applications.
- Close Infrastructure and Investment Screening Gaps, by amending the Investment Canada Act to create Arctic-specific review triggers tailored for investment projects in strategically sensitive geographic regions and designate Arctic strategic infrastructure as a sensitive sector under national security provisions.
- Protect Indigenous Communities from Unvetted Foreign Engagement, by developing a security advisory mechanism that brings together federal, territorial, and Indigenous partners to the vetting process for foreign infrastructure and development proposals; amending the Investment Canada Act to explicitly include unsolicited subnational infrastructure offers as reviewable investments; expanding Indigenous infrastructure funding to reduce vulnerability to foreign offers; and reinforcing and expanding existing initiatives that provide national security training to Indigenous leadership and local development partners.
- Counter Foreign Narrative Influence; through building on Canada’s existing Arctic diplomacy strategy by launching and funding a dedicated public diplomacy component that proactively shapes narratives; conducting a regulatory review of Chinese state-controlled broadcasters in Canada; aligning scientific cooperation policies with security priorities; and tightening Canada’s policy on Arctic research collaboration by limiting partnerships to trusted allies.
- Enhance Allied Coordination and Arctic Presence; by expanding joint Arctic operational facilities with likeminded allies such as the US, Norway, Sweden, Finland, or Denmark and trilateral and multilateral exercises focused on northern domain awareness; negotiating critical mineral and rare earths supply agreements with allies to diversify Canada’s export markets and reduce strategic reliance on China; building on existing forums such as the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) to establish an Arctic-focused working group within NATO; augment Canada’s Arctic diplomacy beyond reliance on ‘soft power’ by incorporating enforceable mechanisms; and deepening Canada's involvement in allied technology-sharing platforms to accelerate the development and deployment of Arctic-tailored surveillance and dual-use detection systems.
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